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COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
W. DANIEL ENGLISH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
STANDARD OPTICAL CO., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Priority No. 16 
Case No. 900422-CA 
Defendant/Appellant Standard Optical Company ("Standard") 
submits the following brief in reply to the Brief of 
Plaintiff/Respondent W. Daniel English ("English") and in support 
of its appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STANDARD IS NOT BARRED FROM 
RAISING A STATUTE OF FRAUDS DEFENSE. 
The first issue English raises in his brief is whether 
Standard waived 
its right to interpose the statute of frauds 
as a defense to the oral agreement to pay 
$1,000 per month for the third 36-month 
period of the written lease as a result of 
Standard's admission in its pleadings and at 
trial that it agreed to pay $1,000 per month. 
English Brief, p. 1. English then devotes POINT II of his Brief 
to the argument that Standard admitted at trial and in its Trial 
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Brief the existence and all the essential terms of an agreement 
to extend the Lease for another 36 months and is therefore barred 
from asserting the statute of frauds defense. English Brief, pp. 
16-20. Standard expressly denies the premise of this argument. 
A. Standard did not waive the statute of frauds defense. 
English has conveniently failed to reveal to the Court that, 
in his Complaint, he did not allege an oral agreement on an 
extension or on any of the terms of the lease. After presenting 
his case at trial, and over the express objection of appellant, 
English moved to amend his complaint to include a claim that on 
November 2, 1988 the parties orally agreed on a rental amount for 
the next 36 months. Trial Transcript, Vol. II, p. 42, lines 5-
7. Despite Standard's opposition to English's motion to amend, 
the trial court granted the motion. Id. at pp. 42-44. Standard 
then made a timely motion to amend its Answer to include the 
statute of frauds defense. That motion was granted without 
opposition from English. I^d. at pp. 44-45. 
Prior to the trial court granting English's motion to amend, 
there was no reason for Standard to assert a statute of frauds 
defense as no oral agreement had been alleged. Standard 
therefore could not have waived the defense. Indeed, the only 
conceivable waiver under these facts, is English's waiver of the 
right to assert an oral agreement. Despite the fact that English 
knew the facts upon which he based his claim prior to his 
commencing this action, he failed to plead an oral agreement 
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until halfway through the trial. His motion to amend was 
untimely and granting it was clearly prejudicial to Standard. 
B. English waived the issues it raises for the first time on 
appeal. 
This is the first time English has raised the issue of a 
waiver of the statute of frauds defense in this lawsuit. The 
issue was not raised below, in argument at trial, or in English's 
Memorandum in Response to Standard's Motion to Amend the 
Judgment. 
The Utah Supreme Court has forcefully and consistently held 
that an appeals court will not consider issues raised before it 
for the first time. Sorenson v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 (Utah 
1987); Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Utah 1987); Insley 
Mfg. Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 
1986). In Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 
P. 2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983), the court stated that the record 
must clearly show that an issue was "timely presented to the 
trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon; we 
cannot assume that it was properly raised." If a party fails to 
present an issue to the trial court, it will have "waived the 
right to raise it" on appeal. Utah County v. Brouwn, 62 P.2d 83, 
85 (Utah 1983). "It is axiomatic that defenses and claims not 
raised by the parties in a trial [court] cannot be considered for 
the first time on appeal." Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 
102 (Utah 1983). 
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Because English did not raise the issue of a waiver of the 
Statute of Frauds defense in the trial court, he has waived the 
right to raise that issue on appeal. Consequently, POINT II of 
plaintiff's brief should not be considered by this Court. 
POINT II 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS PRECLUDES 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE LEASE AFTER AUGUST 1988. 
Standard acknowledges that the writing necessary to satisfy 
the statute of frauds may be comprised of several memoranda 
which, taken together, contain the terms of the agreement. In 
the instant case, however, the "memoranda" relied upon by English 
and the trial court do not contain the terms of the alleged 
agreement. 
English had the burden of proving an agreement on the 
essential terms of a lease renewal. In this case, those terms 
included agreement upon a 36-month duration. English asks this 
Court to supply the essential 36-month term of duration by 
implication. Such a critical and material term, however, cannot 
be implied. 
English relies upon the proposition that the statute of 
frauds may be satisfied by looking at the implied references in 
the various writings and the surrounding circumstances. English 
Brief, p. 23. The evidence adduced at trial, however, is of 
written references and surrounding circumstances directly 
contrary to finding an agreement to renew the lease. 
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The evidence in the record suggests that no agreement was 
reached as to rental for a renewal term of 36 months. The 
undisputed evidence is that both parties knew a writing 
specifying the amount of rent to be paid, the term of the 
extension and signed by the parties was required to renew the 
lease. Trial Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 11-13. Nonetheless, no 
attempt was made by either party to draft such a writing after 
August 1988. 
English acknowledges that the parties had been negotiating 
for a "settlement" or "buyout" (English Brief, pp. 26-27), but 
nevertheless asserts that Schubach's November 2, 1988 statement 
that Standard would pay $1,000 a month constituted an agreement 
to renew the lease for an additional 36 months rather than an 
agreement on a buyout or settlement. Such an interpretation is 
not supported by the record.a 
Furthermore, it is undisputed that English changed the locks 
on the premises on October 18, 1988. The natural consequence of 
changing the locks on a building is to deprive the persons with 
keys to the original locks of access and possession. As a matter 
of law, it is assumed that one intends the natural consequences 
of his acts. In the instant case, there is no evidence that 
a
 It should be noted that, since the trial and less than 
36 months after the alleged lease renewal, English sold 
the building at 3525 Market Street to the West Valley 
RDA and the building has been torn down. Thus, prior 
to expiration of the alleged renewed lease, English has 
rendered his performance impossible. 
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anyone other than Standard and English had a key to the original 
locks on the premises. The only permissible implication of 
English changing the locks is that he intended to deprive 
Standard of access to and possession of the premises. Such an 
intent is clearly inconsistent with English's argument that the 
parties intended to renew the lease. 
Even English's letter of December 2, 1988, which the trial 
court relied upon to satisfy the statute of frauds, indicates 
that English's intent was directly contrary to a lease renewal. 
See Trial Exhibit 13P (included in Addendum to Standard's opening 
Brief). He indicates an intent to rent the premises to another 
tenant and to complete "settlement" with Standard. Id. It is 
inconceivable how such a memorandum could be sufficient to 
evidence an agreement to renew the lease with Standard. 
Rhetorically, one is compelled to ask: Why 36 months? Why 
not one year or four years? The base lease provided that it 
would run for 10 years but the rent had to be renegotiated every 
three years. It did not provide that renewals had to be in 
three-year increments — that would make no sense because 10 is 
not equally divisible by three. The fact is that there is no 
evidence in the record before this Court evidencing an intent by 
either party to renew the lease for three years. 
To conclude that the statute of frauds requirements are 
satisfied by the writings and testimony in evidence in this case 
would require such a tortured interpretation of the statute that 
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it would, in effect, be stripped of all practical meaning. The 
burden of proof in this case is on English. He had to prove that 
the parties agreed to renew the lease for an additional 36 months 
and he has simply failed to do so. 
POINT III 
ENGLISH HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT HE GAVE ANY 
CONSIDERATION FOR A LEASE RENEWAL. 
As Standard explained more fully in its opening brief, a 
lease contract must necessarily include the landlord's conveyance 
of a right of exclusive possession to the tenant. See Standard 
Brief, p. 22. English does not dispute that this is the law. 
English's position continues to be that, in November 1988, 
Standard promised to pay rent under the 1982 lease for an 
additional 36 months in exchange for nothing from English. Such 
a promise, even if made, is not an enforceable contract. 
English's argument that Standard was never deprived of 
possession of the premises is unsupported by the evidence and 
incorrect as a matter of law. First, he takes the untenable 
position that "Standard effectively gave English permission to 
change the lock" by "declarfing] that it was not in the leasing 
business and that it was English who was in the leasing 
business." English Brief, p. 31. English argues that this 
"instruction" implied that English could change the locks before 
•7 
finding another tenant. jDd. Acceptance of this argument 
requires an incredible stretch of the imagination.2 
English further confuses the issue of possession. His 
argument is essentially two-pronged. While he admits he changed 
the locks without notifying Standard, he argues that because he 
did not intend to deprive Standard of possession, and because 
Standard was able to gain access to the premises each time it 
tried, Standard was never deprived of possession. 
Whether English deprived Standard of possession of the 
premises is clearly not a question of English's subjective 
intent, especially where it relates to the issue of 
consideration. Furthermore, English's argument that Standard 
continued in possession because it was never denied access is 
like arguing that because a customer has never been denied access 
to a 7-Eleven, he has possession of the store. The flaw in such 
an argument is apparent. 
English's uncontradicted testimony at trial was that after 
October 18, 1988 Standard had to demand a key from English to 
gain access to the premises. Trial Transcript, Vol. I, pp. 
136-137, lines 18-1 and p. 139, lines 4-7; and See Dore 
Testimony, Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, p. 36, lines 7-12. The Utah 
2
 In connection with this argument, English for the first 
time raises an estoppel and waiver argument. See 
English Brief, pp. 32-33. English never raised 
estoppel and waiver in the trial court and is precluded 
from now raising these issues on appeal. See Point I, 
B. , infra. 
Supreme Court has unequivocally stated as a matter of law that 
where a landlord has changed the locks on a leased premises, he 
has deprived the tenant of possession, even where the tenant is 
able to obtain access upon demand. Bass v. Planned Management 
Services, 761 P.2d 566 (Utah 1988). On this issue, Bass is 
indistinguishable from the instant case. 
English has failed to establish that he gave any 
consideration to Standard for the alleged promise of Standard to 
pay rent for an additional 36 months. Under these circumstances 
there could be no enforceable lease after August 1988. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Standard Optical Company 
respectfully requests that the judgment below be reversed and 
judgment entered in favor of Standard Optical Company. 
DATED this A>~ day of January, 1991. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
ByC^^^q^t 
George A./Hunt 
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